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Abstract
This paper studies secure multiparty quantum computation (SMQC) without
nonlocal measurements. Firstly, this task is reduced to secure two-party
quantum computation of nonlocal controlled-NOT (NL-CNOT) gate. Then,
in the passive adversaries model, the secure computation of NL-CNOT is
reduced to bit commitment. Thus, a SMQC scheme can be constructed
based on bit commitment. This scheme does not depend on trusted third
party, and is secure in the passive adversaries model. It is also pointed out
that a vulnerability exists in any secure two-party quantum computation
protocol of NL-CNOT gate.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, secure multiparty computation, bit
commitment, quantum circuit, passive adversaries
1. Introduction
Secure multiparty computation is a fundamental cryptographic primitive
in modern cryptography. It focuses on the studies of secure computation
among the players that do not trust each other. In quantum cryptogra-
phy, it is also studied extensively as secure multiparty quantum computation
(SMQC). The SMQC has been studied from two aspects: 1) the evaluation of
classical function with quantum protocol, and 2) the evaluation of quantum
transformation.
Lo [1] studied one-sided two party computation of classical function, and
proved that the task cannot be realized securely with quantum protocols.
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Later, Refs. [2, 3] strengthened this impossibility result: two-sided secure
two-party computation of classical function is also impossible with quantum
protocols.
Secure multiparty computation of quantum circuit is also studied [4–
8]. Ref. [4] presented a verifiable quantum secret sharing protocol, based
on which constructed a SMQC scheme. This construction of SMQC can
tolerate ⌊n−1
6
⌋ cheaters among n players. This threshold was improved to
⌊n−1
4
⌋ in [5]. Dupuis et al. studied secure two-party quantum computation,
and proposed a two-party protocol for secure evaluation of unitaries against
specious adversaries [7], later the protocol was improved to securely compute
any quantum operation against active adversaries [8].
Recently, Ref. [9] presented a quantum fully homomorphic encryption
(QFHE) scheme, and described a SMQC scheme of unitaries with trusted
third party (TTP) based on QFHE scheme.
This paper studies SMQC without nonlocal measurements. The SMQC
task is reduced to secure two-party quantum computation of nonlocal CNOT
(NL-CNOT), and then the protocol presented in [9] can be simplified. Then
the secure computation protocol of NL-CNOT is reduced to bit commitment.
2. Preliminaries
Firstly, the model of SMQC studied in this paper is introduced here. Sup-
pose there are n parties who jointly perform a computational task of quantum
circuit. The input of the circuit is a m-qubit state. The n parties are de-
noted as P1, · · · , Pn, whose inputs have k1, · · · , kn qubits (m =
∑n
i=1 ki),
respectively. Through their local quantum computation and mutual commu-
nication, they accomplish the computational task, and each party can obtain
the desired result. The quantum circuits are limited to be those containing
no nonlocal measurements.
In this model, any two of the n parties are mutually distrusted, and each
party may be dishonest. According to the possible cheating behaviors of
dishonest participants, the SMQC can have the different models, such as
passive adversaries model, active adversaries model, or else. Here, passive
adversaries model refers that the dishonest parties merely gather information
during the execution of SMQC protocol, and the active adversaries model
refers that the dishonest parties take active steps to disrupt the execution
of multiparty protocol. In any multiparty protocol, each party may change
its local input before even entering the execution of the protocol. This is
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also unavoidable when the parties utilize a trusted party. So, this is not
considered a breach of security [10].
Ref. [9] constructed a SMQC of unitaries with TTP based on QFHE.
The scheme is described as follows: each party (P1, · · · , or Pn) preshares a
secret key with TTP through quantum key distribution (QKD); Then each
party encrypts his data with his secret key, and sends the ciphertext to TTP;
Using the preshared secret key, the TTP performs the quantum circuit on
the encrypted data according to QFHE scheme; The TTP sends back the
ouputs to the corresponding parties, and then each party can decrypt the
received state and obtain the desired result. This scheme is secure not only
in the passive adversaries model but also in the active adversaries model.
For some protocol σ and some protocol pi, we denote by σpi the protocol
where σ invokes instances of pi.
Quantum universal composition (UC) theorem [6]: Let pi, ρ and
σ be quantum polynomial time protocols. Assume that pi quantum-UC-
emulates ρ. Then σpi quantum-UC-emulates σρ.
This theorem holds for both computational security and statistical se-
curity (information-theoretical security or perfect security). Quantum UC
theorem ensures that if the quantum protocol pi can securely realize a func-
tionality F , then the protocol σpi can securely realize a functionality σF .
3. Multiparty quantum computation with trusted third party
This section introduces the reduction from multiparty quantum compu-
tation to two-party quantum computation of NL-CNOT. Any unitary trans-
formation can be decomposed into some CNOT and single-qubit transforma-
tions, so any unitary transformation U can be expressed by a quantum circuit
CU that consists of only CNOT and single-qubit gates. We consider n parties
P1, · · · , Pn participate in the joint computation of the quantum circuit CU .
Each of them Pi has ki qubits as the inputs of the circuit, respectively. The
circuit CU has m =
∑n
i=1 ki qubits as its input.
The m-qubit input of the circuit comes from all the n parties. Because
the CNOT gate is performed on two qubits, the CNOT gates in the circuit
can be classified into two kinds: (1) local CNOT, which acts on the two
qubits belonging to the same party, and (2) NL-CNOT, which acts on the
two qubits belonging to two different parties.
For an arbitrary party Pi, there are many single-qubit gates performing
on his ki-qubit input in the circuit. According to the computing sequence,
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these single-qubit gates are split into some small-scale quantum circuits by
the NL-CNOT gates in the circuit. The small-scale quantum circuit acts only
on his ki qubits, so it is called local quantum circuit (LQC). Thus, the joint
quantum circuit CU can be seen as a combination of some NL-CNOT gates
and LQCs. For example, any joint quantum circuit CU can be expressed
similarly to this form in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Quantum circuit to be computed jointly by n parties. It can be seen as a
combination of some NL-CNOT gates and local quantum circuits (LQCs).
Because these LQCs are performed on their local qubits, the joint compu-
tation of the whole quantum circuit CU only requires the joint computation
of every NL-CNOT gate. According to quantum UC theorem [6], if the
two-party computation of NL-CNOT is secure, then there exists a SMQC
protocol for the unitary quantum circuit CU . Thus, the SMQC of unitary
circuit is reduced to two-party quantum computation of NL-CNOT.
In general quantum circuit, there may be some quantum measurements.
The measurements may be local or nonlocal. The local measurement means
that it acts simultaneously on the qubits belonging to the same party. If the
quantum circuit contains no nonlocal measurement, the SMQC of quantum
circuit can also be reduced to two-party quantum computation of NL-CNOT.
In order to implement ideal NL-CNOT functionality by secure two-party
protocol, we can still adopt the TTP in the similar way to the SMQC pre-
sented in [9]. The difference is that it is unnecessary to employ the QFHE
scheme, while the QHE scheme of CNOT is sufficient here. The detail is as
follows. Suppose Alice and Bob intend to compute a NL-CNOT gate, they
encrypt their qubits (|α〉 and |β〉) using the secret key preshared with TTP
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separately, and send the two qubits to the TTP, then the TTP performs some
quantum operation and sends back the result, finally Alice and Bob decrypt
the received qubits separately and obtain the desired state CNOT (|α〉⊗|β〉).
The n parties intend to jointly compute a quantum circuit consists of
some NL-CNOTs and LQCs (the LQC may contain local measurements).
The LQCs can be computed locally by themselves. Once they have to jointly
compute a NL-CNOT gate, they call the TTP. The call procedure is described
as above. Because the secret key is needed during the call of TTP, they have
to preshare some secret key through QKD, which is unconditionally secure.
In this way, with the help of TTP, we can construct a SMQC protocol for
quantum circuit without nonlocal measurements. This protocol is just an
improvement of the scheme presented in Ref. [9]. In this improved scheme,
one computation of NL-CNOT needs one call of TTP. So it is an interactive
scheme, and each party does not interact with another party. Moreover,
the rounds of interaction depend on the number of NL-CNOT gates in the
quantum circuit.
4. Two-party quantum computation of NL-CNOT
It can be concluded from the previous section that, NL-CNOT plays a
fundamental role in multiparty quantum computation. Here the secure two-
party computation of NL-CNOT will be investigated as the key point. It
will be reduced to bit commitment in the passive adversaries model and
then a secure two-party quantum computation protocol of NL-CNOT will be
proposed.
Denote the four Bell states as: |Bxz〉 = 1√
2
(|0x〉 + (−1)z|1x¯〉), where
x, z ∈ {0, 1}, and x¯ = 1− x. Define quantum entanglement state
|χ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)|00〉+ 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)|11〉.
This quantum state |χ〉 can be prepared using two copies of Bell state |B00〉
and a CNOT gate, e.g. |χ〉 = (I ⊗ CNOT ⊗ I)B00 ⊗B00.
According to the implementation introduced in Refs.[7, 11], NL-CNOT
can be implemented as Figure 2. This implementation involves an exchange
of the two bits ax, bz. If Alice and Bob do not send her/his bit (ax/bz) simul-
taneously, there would leak information about her/his state. The analysis is
referred to Ref.[7]. Anyway, it is not secure to directly use this implementa-
tion of NL-CNOT.
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Figure 2: The remote implementation of NL-CNOT. The above/below of the dotted
line expresses the local quantum operations of Alice/Bob. The dotted rectangle contains
nonlocal computation.
Based on the construction in Figure 2, we should consider how to securely
implement the computation of NL-CNOT. It is obvious from the figure that,
there are two nonlocal elements in this circuit: 1) the preparation of the en-
tanglement state |χ〉; 2) the remote controlled operation in the dotted rect-
angle. The entanglement state |χ〉 can be prepared by any one party. After
one party has prepared the 4-qubit state, he sends two qubits to the other
party. It is secure in the passive adversaries model, because no additional
information is revealed in the fixed state. In the part of the dotted rectangle,
Alice’s local operation Z is controlled by Bob’s measurement result bz, and
Bob’s local operation X is controlled by Alice’s measurement result ax. So,
in order to remotely implement NL-CNOT. Alice and Bob must exchange
their measurement results ax and bz.
Above all, in the passive adversaries model, the security of two-party
quantum computation of NL-CNOT depends on the security of exchanging
two bits (ax and bz). It must avoid the case: one party has received a bit
before sending his bit to the other party. The reason was analyzed in Ref.[7].
Denote SWAP (a, b) the exchange of two bits a, b ∈ {0, 1}. It can be se-
curely implemented using bit commitment as follows: (1)Alice commits a bit
a to Bob, and Bob commits a bit b to Alice; (2)Alice opens her commitment
a, and Bob opens his commitment b.
Next, the detail is presented about the secure two-party quantum com-
putation of NL-CNOT. Suppose Alice posses the control qubit |α〉, and Bob
posses the target qubit |β〉, and the entanglement state |χ〉 is prepared by
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Alice.
1. Alice prepares a 4-qubit entanglement state |χ〉 (the four qubits are
called the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th qubit separately). She sends the 3rd and
4th qubits to Bob, and retains the 1st and 2nd qubits;
2. Alice performs Bell measurement on the control qubit |α〉 and the 1st
qubit, and the result is ax, az; Bob performs Bell measurement on the
4th qubit and target qubit |β〉, and the result is bx, bz;
3. Alice and Bob call the oracle SWAP (ax, bz) to exchange the two bits
ax and bz;
4. Alice performs quantum operation ZbzXaxZaz on the 2nd qubit; Bob
performs quantum operation ZbzXaxXbx on the 3rd qubit; The 2nd
and 3rd qubits are the output.
It can be verified that, the two-qubit output is CNOT (|α〉 ⊗ |β〉), and the
former qubit belongs to Alice, and the latter belongs to Bob.
In the protocol, the 2nd and 4th steps are local quantum operations.
The security of the protocol depends on whether Alice honestly prepares
the state |χ〉, and whether SWAP (ax, bz) is securely implemented. In the
passive adversary model, Alice should prepare the state |χ〉 honestly following
the protocol. Thus, in this model, the security of the protocol depends
only on the secure implementation of SWAP (ax, bz). Moreover, because
SWAP (ax, bz) can be implemented based on bit commitment and its security
depends on the security of bit commitment, the secure two-party quantum
computation of NL-CNOT is reduced to bit commitment.
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive in modern
cryptography. It can be implemented using either classical technique or quan-
tum technique. The classical bit commitment is not so secure as quantum bit
commitment. Though Refs. [12, 13] have proved the impossibility of uncon-
ditionally secure quantum bit commitment. Later, Refs. [14, 15] proved that
the impossibility holds under nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. While in
the relativistic quantum mechanics, an unconditionally secure quantum bit
commitment protocol is proposed by Kent [16]. Thus, this quantum bit
commitment scheme can be used to implement secure two-party quantum
computation of NL-CNOT.
5. Multiparty quantum computation scheme and its security
According to the quantum UC theorem [6], in the SMQC protocol pro-
posed in Section 3, the NL-CNOT functionality implemented by TTP can
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be replaced with the two-party protocol of NL-CNOT proposed in Section
4. Thus, we can obtain a SMQC protocol that does not depend on TTP.
Its security is analyzed, and can be concluded briefly: It is secure against
passive adversaries, and not secure in the active adversaries model; It can be
modified using the technique proposed in Ref. [8] to prevent active attack,
but there still exists a vulnerability. The detail analysis is as follows.
Next, we analyze the security of the SMQC protocol in the passive ad-
versaries model.
It can be known from the protocol that, all the local qubits belonging to
each party have never been transmitted to another party, and the only com-
munication between them is the exchange of classical bits. However, the bits
of each party are randomly generated from the local quantum measurements,
and leak nothing about the other party’s collapsed state after measurements.
Then, in the passive adversaries model, no information about the state of an-
other party is revealed, and the dishonest party can gather no information
during the computation. Thus, it is secure in the passive adversaries model.
However, it is not secure in the active adversaries model. Next, the
analysis is focused on the active attack to the secure computation protocol
of NL-CNOT.
In the secure computation protocol of NL-CNOT, when the entanglement
state |χ〉 is prepared by an active adversary Bob (or Alice), the adversary
can perform any Clifford operator on the 2nd (or 3rd) qubit of |χ〉, and sends
the 1st and 2nd (3rd and 4th) to Alice (or Bob). This causes that the Alice’s
(or Bob’s) result of performing NL-CNOT is transformed with a Clifford
operator, which is unknown to Alice (or Bob). Thus, the result is corrupted,
however, Alice (or Bob) does not realize the corruption.
In active adversaries model, there are another two kinds of attack strategy
to the secure computation protocol of NL-CNOT: (l)Alice can change the
measurement basis; (2)Alice flips the measurement bit ax before exchanging
it with Bob’s bit bz .
The honest Alice performs the Bell measurement using the basis {|Bxz〉|x, z ∈
{0, 1}}. However, the dishonest Alice can performs the measurement using
another measurement basis, e.g. {|B(U)xz〉 | |B(U)xz〉 = U †⊗ I|Bxz〉, x, z ∈
{0, 1}}, where U is some unitary transformation. Then, the output of Figure
2 is |out〉 = CNOT ((U |ϕ〉)⊗|φ〉), where |ϕ〉 and |φ〉 are the inputs. The de-
tails are omitted. The readers can deduce it from the result of teleportation-
based quantum computation [17].
Suppose Alice’s measurement result is ax, az. The dishonest Alice ex-
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changes a′x = 1 − ax with Bob’s measurement bit bz. Then the output of
Figure 2 is |out〉 = CNOT (|ϕ〉 ⊗X|φ〉), where |ϕ〉 and |φ〉 are the inputs.
Similarly, the dishonest Bob can also adopt the above two kinds of attack
strategy in the active adversaries model.
Above all, the SMQC protocol presented here cannot prevent active ad-
versaries. However, it can be modified using the technique proposed in Ref.
[8] to prevent active adversaries. Even if the SMQC protocol is transformed
into an actively secure protocol, a vulnerability still exists. The analysis is
as follows.
Suppose there exists an ideal two-party protocol for NL-CNOT (e.g there
exits an ideal black-box that implements NL-CNOT functionality). If Alice
and Bob’s inputs are |ϕ〉, |φ〉, where |φ〉 is the eigenvector of X (|+〉 or |−〉),
Alice has perfect attack strategy in the active adversaries model.
Proposition 1: Let |φ〉 being the eigien state (|+〉 or |−〉) of Pauli X
operator. Then for any two qubits |ϕ〉 and |ϕ′〉,
tr1[CNOT (|ϕ〉 ⊗ |φ〉)] = tr1[CNOT (|ϕ′〉 ⊗ |φ〉)],
where tr1(·) denotes the partial trace on the first qubit.
The proof is omitted here. From the proposition, when |φ〉 = |+〉 (or |−〉),
CNOT (|ϕ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) and CNOT (|ϕ′〉 ⊗ |φ〉) have the Schmidt decomposition
as follows:
CNOT (|ϕ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) =
∑
k
ak|αk〉 ⊗ |βk〉,
and
CNOT (|ϕ′〉 ⊗ |φ〉) =
∑
k
ak|α′k〉 ⊗ |βk〉.
Because there exists a unitary transformation U1 that transforms |αk〉 to
|α′k〉, we can conclude that ∃U1, such that
CNOT (|ϕ′〉 ⊗ |φ〉) = (U1 ⊗ I)CNOT (|ϕ〉 ⊗ |φ〉).
This allows Alice to evaluate CNOT between an arbitrary state |ϕ′〉 and the
state |+〉 (or |−〉). Moreover, Alice can perform local transformation U1 to
get the result of CNOT evaluation on any desired input |ϕ′〉, but Bob cannot
find out Alice’s dishonest behavior.
It should be noticed that, although a vulnerability exists in the scheme,
it is still a secure scheme. The reason is similar as that, in modern cryptog-
raphy, the existence of weak key does not mean insecurity of the encryption
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scheme. Moreover, the input state of Bob is unnecessary to be |+〉 or |−〉,
and Alice cannot know whether Bob would choose one of the two state as
his input.
6. Discussions
Ref. [7] presented a secure two-party quantum computation scheme of
unitaries. Our scheme without TTP is a simplify and extension of theirs.
Actually, if the NL-CNOT gate in their scheme is replaced with the protocol
proposed in Section 4, their scheme can be simplified into the two-party
case of our SMQC protocol. In Ref. [7], the key-updating is the core of
their protocol. Because key-updating is relative to the different quantum
gates (e.g. Pauli gates, H,P, T , local CNOT), and the implementation of T
gate needs the call of ideal AND-Box functionality. While in this simplified
scheme, key-updating and ideal AND-Box functionality are not necessary,
and secure bit commitment is sufficient.
This paper studies SMQC, and shows that bit commitment is universal
for SMQC without nonlocal measurements. However, the case that there
exists nonlocal quantum measurements in the quantum circuit has not been
considered. So it is left an open question: is bit commitment sufficient for
secure nonlocal quantum measurement? If it is, then any multiparty quantum
computation can be securely implemented based on bit commitment.
According to Ref. [8], the SMQC protocol here can be improved to resist
active attack. However, a vulnerability still exists in the active adversaries
model. The analysis is shown in the previous section. In consideration of the
fundamental role of CNOT in the quantum computation, we conjecture that
any SMQC protocol has the vulnerability in the active adversaries model.
7. Conclusions
This paper studies SMQC without nonlocal measurements. A SMQC
protocol is constructed based on NL-CNOT functionality, which is imple-
mented with TTP. Moreover, in the passive adversary model, a secure two-
party quantum computation protocol of NL-CNOT is proposed based on bit
commitment. Thus it can be inferred that bit commitment is universal for
SMQC without nonlocal measurements. Based on the two-party protocol of
NL-CNOT, SMQC protocol can be constructed without TTP. In addition,
the security of the two-party protocol of NL-CNOT is analyzed in active
adversaries model.
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